Holodomor

This time of November Holodomor memorial services take place throughout the country. Holodomor translates to "death from hunger". Holodomor was the artificial famine that occured in Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union from 1932 to 1933, somewhere between 2 and 10 million people died of starvation. It's officially been recognized as an act of genocide, though internal sways towards denouncing as well as supporting the Soviet Union have not cemented this issue within Ukraine. In recent years, several trials have taken place to decide how to depict the history of the Soviet Union and Stalin. As I've stressed before, history is critical for Ukraine and affects how it reacts to all challenges and forward steps.

Being in Ukraine for the past year, I've heard a few stories passed down from generation to generation about the famine. About family members who were lost, old friends becoming traitors, silos full of grain that couldn't be touched, journeys trying to escape and bodies spread along barriers fencing out peasants from the cities. A symbol of Ukraine is grain and bread formed into elaborate loves called korovai. In a sense, bread is sacred to Ukrainians and Holodomor has increased its meaning. During Peace Corps training we were told never to throw away bread, it could be one of the most insensitive things we could do. Another way I think the past has shown through is in the generational gap's approach to food. Never mess with a babushka trying to feed you, the idea of hunger is one of her worst enemies. On the other hand, as everywhere else, young women feel the pressure to be thin and I've witnessed too many times to count young girls refuse to eat. It's rather frustrating when you're the guest and they keep on shoving food at you but at the same time they're completely unaware of how their daughters are chronically skipping meals. The idea is still foreign to their older relatives.

The causes of the famine are controversial, from weak harvests to poor management and Stalin's campaigns of collectivization. During collectivization, grain was sent to the cities and abroad to finance industrialization. Ukrainian nationalism was squandered. As stated at holodmorct.org:

1932-1933
The Soviet government increases Ukraine's production quotas by 44%, ensuring that they could not be met. Starvation becomes widespread. Secret decrees are implemented that allow arrest or execution of any starving peasant found taking as little as a few stalks of wheat or a potato from the fields he worked. By decree, discriminatory voucher systems are implemented, and military blockades are erected around Ukrainian villages preventing the transport of food into the villages and the hungry from leaving in search of food. Brigades of young activists from other Soviet regions are brought in to confiscate hidden grain, and eventually all foodstuffs from the peasants’ homes.
Stalin states of Ukraine that “the national question is in essence a rural question” and he and his henchmen determine to “teach a lesson through famine” and ultimately, to deal a
“crushing blow” to the backbone of Ukraine, its rural population.


This past summer I listened to an EconTalk podcast about Nikolai Bukharin, included below are the tapescripts about the event:

14:12

In the late 1920s, Bukharin and Stalin spar over the collectivization of the farms, over the Kulak policy and the Ukraine. Most interesting part of the book for economists and political scientists; points out the clear relationship between violence and non-market allocation. Stalin did not like the peasantry--Marx had already warned against the peasantry. He thought the peasantry should give what he called "tribute" to the city. Bukharin and Stalin sparred over this term "tribute." The way to get this tribute would be to the prices of agricultural products very low, because in Marx you finance industrialization through some kind of surplus. So they were always considering from where the surplus was to come. Stalin said the surplus was from agriculture; the peasant must pay for industrialization and we'll make them pay by setting the price very low. Stalin and his cronies went about establishing a monopoly of grain purchases. Any economist will tell you that if you set the price low--and it was set even below the cost of production--no one is going to sell. Therefore, when the prices were set low, peasants stopped selling. Stalin would declare a grain collection crisis--political action of the peasants aimed against Bolshevik power. It wasn't economic, not just responding to incentives--it was anti-Soviet activity. His only choice, therefore, was to send the militia, secret police, party volunteers in the countryside and take grain by force. Confiscation. This is where he and Bukharin parted company. Bukharin in the early years belonged to a group calling themselves left-Communists, even more extreme than Trotsky; but then Bukharin had an epiphany at some point, which was the result of observing the success of the new agricultural policy which was based on private agriculture and private trade, that you are going to destroy agriculture and social cohesion if you place this burden on agriculture. So Bukharin argued that we have to have a private agriculture; have to let the market set prices; in this way we can avoid force in the countryside. So, this is what they were arguing about--in the Politburo, in the Central Committee. Learned from reading the transcripts of these meetings was they all understood what the game was about. At one point, thought they just didn't understand basic economics. Now I see they understood very well that you have a choice between voluntary exchange through markets and the application of force. That is what clearly split the two.

18:46

The Kulaks--5 to 7 million or so--what's the best estimate of the people who died? Hard to say; this is where our statistics are weakest. The official numbers are several million; several million deportees, high rates of mortality among the deportees. There weren't many executions during this period. Jail was the punishment of choice, 1930, 1931. Most of the victims were victims of starvation during the deportation. They were sent into remote areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan with no means of support. Also, in the area of the grain belt itself there was no food to eat. Looking step by step. First came collectivization and de-Kulakization--the deportation of all your good farmers. This created chaos in agriculture--bad harvests, and bad weather. Debate amongst scholars as to whether it was bad weather or mistakes or deliberate. Didn't they have 70 years of "bad weather" between 1917 and 1987? This was particularly bad; large numbers of deaths; between 5-10 million people died. A lot of debate, deliberate or not; Stalin wasn't particularly fond of Ukraine, which was where most of the deaths occurred. My own reading is that Stalin understood that if you lost that many people, you could actually lose Ukraine, so at one point he said, This is dangerous; We can't lose Ukraine. He tried a little bit to make matters better, but much too late. Also denied those in famine reasons the natural equilibration, which is to leave. So, road blocks were set up; you couldn't get on a train; they caught you and sent you back and you died. Terrible; there was a lot of cannibalism. Bukharin, who had already lost the political struggle, in 1930-31, traveled through Ukraine and saw he had no stomach for this. He came back and told Anna's father--his wife's father--who was his best friend, If this is what the Revolution brings, we should have had no Revolution. He'd seen starving children. Point about the old Bolsheviks: one of the prized traits that Stalin and his associates valued was being tough--not having any sympathy, having a strong stomach. Bukharin did not have this strong stomach.

While hiking this summer in the Georgian mountains, my friend and I stopped to have a lunch break and were then later joined by a group of Germans. One of them happened to be a producer of documentary films who focused on Russia and former Soviet states. When he found out that we were living in Ukraine, he mentioned that he'd been wanting to make a film for a long time about the connection between Albert Kahn, the German-born architect famous for designing industrial Detroit, and the grain shortages. According to the producer, the USSR had hired Kahn to revolutionize industrialization, building over five hundred factories at an enormous sum. The factories were funded by the grain exports. Briefly looking online, there is very little literature about this connection, and being that I'm obsessed with the skeletons of industry left throughout the Rustbelt and the former Soviet Union, it's definitely a tale I'd like to hear.


Last time I was in Kyiv I picked up a copy of The Harvest of Sorrow by Robert Conquest in the volunteer lounge. I haven't read it yet but I'm wishing I had done so by now so that I could properly outline the topic.